Differential privacy provides the first theoretical foundation with provable privacy guarantee against adversaries with arbitrary prior knowledge. The main idea to achieve differential privacy is to inject random noise into statistical query results. Besides correctness, the most important goal in the design of a differentially private mechanism is to reduce the effect of random noise, ensuring that the noisy results can still be useful.
INTRODUCTION
Rapid advances in information technology and computational capacity are raising concerns regarding the privacy of sensitive personal information. Previous work has shown Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. WPES '11, October 17, 2011 , Chicago, Illinois, USA. Copyright 2011 ACM 978-1-4503-1002-4/11/10 ...$10.00. that even after removing all personal identity attributes such as names and addresses, adversaries may still be able to identify specific individuals by combining their prior knowledge with the published attributes in the database, e.g., age, gender and race. For example, in 2007, a team of researchers successfully reidentified two customers in the "anonymized" Netflix data set [1] , based on their transaction histories with Netflix and movie comments on IMDB [17] . Moreover, recent studies show that group statistics are also vulnerable to privacy attacks due to inference techniques combining anonymized data and existing and/or public information. In Genome Wide Association Studies (GWAS), for instance, the DNA samples from participating patients are mixed to prevent disclosure of their identities, and only statistics regarding the prevalence of particular single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) are published. However, an adversary can still verify the presence of a specific person in the mixture with high confidence, given a DNA sample from that person and a reference DNA mixture [13, 19] . Such privacy problems have become a major obstacle to biomedical research, as they make access to useful input data increasingly difficult to obtain.
To tackle these problems, numerous privacy protection frameworks have been proposed. Among these, differential privacy outshines others in providing strong robustness guarantee against attacks from adversaries with arbitrary prior knowledge. Simply put, a randomized mechanism (query answering method) for answering statistical queries satisfies differential privacy if and only if the query results will be almost identical after modifying or deleting one of the records in the database [9] . This requirement ensures that sensitive information in a record almost cannot be inferred, even if the adversary knows the values of all the other records in the database.
To achieve differential privacy, one basic mechanism is to add random noise to the statistical query results [9] . In particular, given the unperturbed query result and a parameter called the privacy budget, the mechanism randomly selects a number following a Laplace distribution, with mean at the original query result and scale proportional to the sensitivity (discussed later) of the queries times 1 . Theoretical analysis shows that the resulting randomness in the query result fulfills the requirements of differential privacy with respect to privacy budget . While this basic mechanism handles a single query quite well, it is not effective for processing a large number of queries, as it requires a privacy budget linear in the number of queries to maintain a given level of result accuracy. Thus queries may quickly exhaust the total privacy budget assigned to a database, forcing the database to be taken offline to avoid unacceptable privacy breaches. In such situations, a better alternative is to build a compact, privacy-preserving synopsis from the data with a fixed amount of privacy budget, such that it is capable of answering all possible queries.
There have been several previous efforts to design and construct such synopses, e.g., wavelets [20] , trees [12] and linear summation basis [14, 10, 5] . These synopsis structures are lossless, meaning that they preserve all information in the original database. In other words, the original statistics can be completely and accurately recovered by running the corresponding decoding algorithms on the synopsis structures. Consequently, the size of these synopses, as well as the privacy budget they require, grow linearly with the size of the dataset.
This paper explores a new direction: probabilistic synopses based on compressive sensing [7, 3, 4] . Figure 1 illustrates this new compressive sensing mechanism. Using a sparse representation of the original data. Using a sparse representation of the original data, we use compressive sensing to encode a very small synopsis, compared to the original database size. We then (i) add Laplace noise to the synopsis, making it differentially private; (ii) decode the synopsis, creating a noisy version of the original data; and (iii) answer an unlimited number of queries over the decoded data, without adding additional noise. The compressive sensing mechanism allows us to use less noise than previous synopsis proposals under certain conditions, and provides much more accurate statistical query results after decoding. Unlike previous methods that focus on specific classes of queries, the compressive sensing mechanism is universal, supporting all possible queries on the decoded noisy data. Thus the compressive sensing mechanism can be seamlessly incorporated into any applications with privacy concerns, from GWAS analysis to user transaction history mining. We show that the compressive mechanism improves the accuracy of the result statistics by up to an order of magnitude, in both theoretical analysis as well as empirical studies.
PRELIMINARIES

Notation
We use R (R + ) to denote the set of real numbers (positive real numbers) and [1, n] to represent the integer set {1, 2, . . . , n}. For two vectors v, w ∈ R n , v, w means their inner product. The p-norm (p is a positive integer) of a vector v ∈ R n is defined to be ( n i=1 |v[i]| p ) 1 p and is denoted by ||v||p. For example, the 2-norm of the difference of t-wo points gives their Euclidian distance. We write log for log 2 . The number e is the base of natural logarithms. We let Lap(λ) denote the one-dimensional Laplace distribution centered at 0 with scale λ and the corresponding density function g(x) = 1 2λ e − |x| λ . We use other notation common in theoretical computer science. When describing asymptotic complexity, we useÕ (pronounced soft-O) as a variant of O (pronounced big-O) that ignores logarithmic factors. For instance, if the complexity is O(n/ log n), we simply writeÕ(n). Also, exp(n) means e Cn for some constant C. With high probability means with probability at least 0.99.
Compressive Sensing
This section gives a brief overview of the theory of compressive sensing, and we refer the reader to an excellent survey [3] for more information. Compressive sensing consists of a probabilistic compression procedure, also called the sampling process, followed by a reconstruction process that decodes the compressed data. The sampling process reduces the data size from O(n) to O(log n). The rather complex decoding process exactly or approximately reconstructs the original data from the compressed samples. Readers who are not interested in the mathematics underlying the compressive sensing technique should skip to the next section.
In what follows, all vectors are over R n unless otherwise noted. Consider a vector D that we wish to represent using an orthonormal basis (such as a standard basis, or a wavelet basis)
be the coefficient sequence of D under the new basis Ψ. Then we have:
If we treat Ψ as an n × n matrix with ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n as the columns, D can be written as Ψx, and we say that x represents D under the new basis. We call x S-sparse if it has at most S nonzero entries. Let xS be obtained from x by replacing its n − S coefficients with the smallest absolute values by 0. Then xS is S-sparse.
Often data are compressible. Given a constant 0 < p < 1, we say vector x is (p-)compressible with magnitude R if its components taken in sorted order obey |x (i) | ≤ R·i −1/p , ∀i ∈ [1, n]. A compressible vector x can be well approximated by an S-sparse vector in the sense that ||x − xS||1 ≤ Cp · R · S 1−1/p for some constant Cp. A vector D has an (S-)sparse representation if there is an orthonormal basis Ψ (called a sparse basis) where D's representation x is sparse or compressible, i.e., x is S-sparse or is compressible to an S-sparse vector xS.
The input to compressive sensing is a vector D with a sparse representation. Then there is a sampling process which can be characterized as a linear mapping. We use a matrix Φ ∈ R k×n to describe the sampling operator and the result is a vector y = ΦD ∈ R k .
Up to now, we have clarified the input and the sampling process, obtaining a sample vector y = ΦD ∈ R k with k = Θ(S log(n/S)). The next and final step is to reconstruct the vector D from y through the sparse representation of D. The samples may be contaminated with an unknown noise e ∈ R k , and the sample vector becomes y * = y + e = ΦD + e = Ax + e, where A = ΦΨ is known from the sampling process. Candès, Romberg and Tao [2] prove the remarkable and surprising result that by solving a combinatorial optimization problem, the recovered answer x * ∈ R n can be close enough to x even in the presence of unknown perturbations. Needell and Tropp [18] prove essentially the same error bound using a greedy algorithm.
Lemma 1. Suppose A satisfies restricted isometry property (RIP) [2] and ||e||2 ≤ θ.
, for some constants C2 and C3.
Differential Privacy
In this paper, we represent a database as a vector D ∈ R n . This abstraction encompasses many previous abstractions of data. Two databases D1, D2 ∈ R n are said to be neighboring iff ||D1 − D2||1 ≤ 1. The notion of differential privacy is defined as follows.
Definition 1 ( [9, 8] ). A randomized mechanism K provides -differential privacy if for all neighboring databases D1, D2 ∈ R n and all Sub ⊆ Range(K),
where the probability space in each case is over the coin flips of K.
A popular mechanism for achieving -differential privacy is the Laplace mechanism [9] , which can be used when the output of the mechanism is numeric. McSherry and Talwar developed a technique called the exponential mechanism [16] for problems where the output is non-numeric.
Laplace mechanism: The sensitivity of a query Q :
for all neighboring D1, D2 ∈ R n . [9] shows the following result:
Lemma 2. For Q : R n → R d , mechanism KQ that adds independently generated noise with distribution Lap(ΔQ/ ) to each of the d output values provides -differential privacy. Exponential mechanism: This mechanism applies to case where the query answer y is not numerical. We rely on a pre-defined utility function u(D, y) (with a numeric output) to measure the quality of y, compared to the exact answer. The exponential mechanism outputs y with probability proportional to e − u(D,y)/(2Δu) , where Δu is the sensitivity of the utility function u(D, y). The exponential mechanism provides -differential privacy [16] . The distance of an answer from the best answer, which has the smallest u, exhibits an exponential tail and with probability almost 1, the exponential mechanism outputs an object with an approximately optimal value.
Continual mechanism and pan-privacy: For the case where the database is updated over time, the theory community has investigated what they call differential privacy under continual observation [10] . In their setting, the input is no longer a static vector, but instead a stream of 0's and 1's, denoted by σ ∈ {0, 1} T , where T is an upper limit of time. The continual mechanism [10] receives an input σ[t] ∈ {0, 1} at each time t ∈ [1, T ], and outputs an approximation to the number of 1's seen in the length t prefix of the stream.
Two streams' prefixes σt, σ t ∈ {0, 1} t , t ∈ [1, T ], are neighboring iff ||σt − σ t ||1 ≤ 1. The definition of -differential pan-privacy under continual observation [11, 10] is stronger than -differential privacy and is stated as follows.
Definition 2 ( [11, 10] ). Let IK denote the set of internal states of the randomized mechanism K. K provides -differential pan-privacy (against a single intrusion) if for all neighboring stream prefixes σt, σ t ∈ {0, 1} t , t ∈ [1, T ] and for all sets I ⊆ IK and Sub ⊆ Range(K),
PROBLEM DEFINITION
This section formally defines the problems investigated in this paper. Specifically, we focus on -differentially private randomized mechanisms with numeric outputs, which can be formalized as K : R n → R d . Such randomized mechanisms can be used to answer (numeric) statistical queries (in the form of Q : R n → R d ) about a database. We begin with the notion of an identity query, which just returns the entire database unchanged. Intuitively, the purpose of a universal mechanism is to accurately answer the identity query, subject to differential privacy.
Definition 3. A universal mechanism with respect to a class X of databases is a randomized mechanism UX : X → R n for answering the identity query, satisfying the following conditions:
• -differential privacy;
• with high probability, ||D − D * ||2 = O(log(n)/ ), for any input D ∈ X and its corresponding output D * ∈ R n .
A universal mechanism is a good base for answering all kinds of statistical queries. To answer any query Q, we first apply UX to a database D ∈ X, obtaining D * . Then we deterministically compute an answer to Q over D * . Since D * must be very close to D, utility can be guaranteed for any query.
Another important property of a universal mechanism is that it allows us to answer an unbounded number of queries without any concern for privacy budget issues. Previous -differential privacy mechanisms can only answer a finite number of statistical queries, due to the budget limit. For example, if a mechanism answers two queries each in an -differentially private way, then the mechanism may have provided only 2 -differential privacy overall. The universal mechanism does not have this problem, as any system based on a universal mechanism always satisfies -differential privacy, no matter how many queries are asked.
One additional advantage of universal mechanisms is that D * can be published in its entirety, thus supporting both interactive and non-interactive querying. For example, biologists who perform GWAS can simply publish allele frequencies, rather than answering queries about the frequencies. So a universal mechanism itself can be very useful, even without consideration of subsequent queries.
To summarize, a universal mechanism is resilient to any form and any number of statistical attacks from any number and kind of malicious attackers, which makes it universally robust. Meanwhile, the statistical query results remain relatively accurate, as D * must be very close to D. The Laplace mechanism is not a universal mechanism, as its error rate increases rapidly with the number of queries. Suppose we use it to answer the identity query for D, producing D * . With high probability ||D − D * ||2 = Θ( √ n/ ) (by using a Chernoff-like argument). Nor is any other known -differentially private randomized mechanism universal. The challenge, then is to devise a universal mechanism. In later sections we introduce the compressive mechanism and show that it is a universal mechanism with respect to databases with a sparse representation. Table 1 compares the error bounds of the compressive mechanism and other contenders.
A universal mechanism can also be helpful for databases that get updated. The continual mechanism of [10] can only answer linear counting queries (more precisely, only range counting queries starting from the first timestamp). We aim to establish a pan-private mechanism such that at each time t, we can answer any query over the database states (D[1], . . . , D[t] ) we have seen so far. We will realize this ambition by designing a mechanism for answering the identity query at each time t. The definition of the identity query in a dynamic setting is a straightforward generalization of identity queries in a static setting, and we omit it here.
COMPRESSIVE MECHANISM
The overall aim of the compressive mechanism is to answer the identity query for databases that have a sparse representation, in an -differentially private manner. Algorithm 1 summarizes the compressive mechanism. The input to the compressive mechanism includes the privacy budget and a database D whose sparse representation is a compressible vector x under an orthonormal basis Ψ ∈ R n×n . Vector x can be well approximated by its xS, for some constant S. X is the set of all databases with a sparse representation.
Applying the sampling operator Φ produces a sample vector y = ΦD ∈ R k , where k = Θ(S log(n/S)). We add random noise to each entry of y. That is to say, for every y
[i], we have y * [i] = y[i] + e[i], where e[i] ∼ Lap(
√ k/ ). Then y * = y + e. We can recover a noisy x * from y * through the reconstruction process of compressed sensing. A noisy D * is obtained by D * = Ψx * . Finally, D * is output by the compressive mechanism.
To analyze the proposed algorithm above, we first show that it satisfies -differential privacy. All proofs appear in the full version of the paper [15] .
Lemma 3. The compressive mechanism satisfies -differential privacy.
Algorithm 1 Compressive Mechanism
Input: privacy budget ∈ R + , D ∈ X (possibly together with a sparse basis Ψ ∈ R n×n ). Output: D * ∈ R n . Next we demonstrate that D * is very close to D, thus ensuring utility. The above two lemmata lead immediately to the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The compressive mechanism is a universal mechanism with respect to databases with a sparse representation.
The compressive mechanism is -differentially private for all D ∈ R n , and works especially well in terms of error bounds for D ∈ X.
Consider the issue of choosing the right S, the sparsity parameter. S may not be known in advance, and we may have to choose the best (i.e., with least error) S ourselves. S depends on the input data D, and since k = Θ(S log(n/S)) and ||e||2 = O(k/ ), S also affects the encoding (adding noise) results. Therefore, we have to choose S in a differentially private way, and a natural method to achieve this aim is the exponential mechanism. S could be any element in [1, n] (if we require the compressive mechanism to work for all possible D ∈ R n ), and for each possible S, we define its utility function as
where C2 and C4 are (known) constants. The right hand side of (1) is the upper bound on the error according to Lemma 1 (with θ instantiated). We calculate that the sensitivity of
where C5 is a constant. Accordingly, the exponential mechanism outputs S with probability proportional to e − u(S)/(2Δ u(S) ) , where u(S) stands for u(D, S); satisfies -differential privacy; and ensures the near-optimality of S with truly negligible failure probability.
If the total privacy budget is , we may choose to distribute a small portion (say, 0.1 or 0.01 ) to the selection of parameter S. In this case, the analysis of the compressive mechanism remains unchanged (recall that we analyze the error in an asymptotic way).
The compressive mechanism also involves the art of identifying a suitable orthonormal basis Ψ ∈ R n×n under which D ∈ R n can be sparse or compressible. This is a mature and profound area in mathematics that has been explored for many years, and we refer the reader to an outstanding book [6] . In this paper, we simply assume that D ∈ X has a sparse representation and its sparse basis Ψ ∈ R n×n could be treated as part of the input. In fact, many natural data sets have a sparse representation [3] , and that is one reason why compressed sensing has been so widely used since its invention.
CONTINUAL OBSERVATION
This section focuses on an extension of the compressive mechanism, the compressive mechanism under continual observation, or CMCO for short.
As in the static case, we suppose that X ⊆ R T is the set of all databases with a sparse representation. The overall aim of CMCO is to answer the identity query at each time t in a differentially pan-private manner. The main steps of CMCO are summarized in Algorithm 2.
CMCO takes as input a constant , the parameter for differential pan-privacy; and (a prefix of) D ∈ X, which has a sparse representation x ∈ R T under sparse basis Ψ ∈ R T ×T . The input differs from the static case in that we do not receive all of D at once, but one value at a time; more precisely, at each time t, we receive
At each time t, we generate a new random vector Φt ∈ R k (recall that k = Θ(S log(T /S)), where S is the sparsity parameter of x). Each entry of Φt is distributed according to a symmetric Bernoulli distribution; more concretely,
Upon receiving D[t]
, we apply Φt to it and get a new vector ut = ΦtD[t] ∈ R k . As a result, by time t, there are t vectors u1,
As t grows, the size of mi ∈ R t increases correspondingly. We apply k independent continual mechanisms to each mi to estimate the sum of the first t entries in mi ∈ R t in an -differentially pan-private way. The k independent continual mechanisms return a vector v * t ∈ R k with each entry v * t [i] representing the estimate of the sum of the first t entries in mi. We use v * t ∈ R k as a resource for reconstruction and obtain a noisy x * t ∈ R t . We obtain
where Ψt ∈ R t×t is the orthonormal basis (of the corresponding Ψ ∈ R T ×T ) in a space of smaller dimension.
We do not store M ∈ R k×t at all; and we just discuss it for analysis. What we store at each time t is simply what is stored for the k -differentially pan-private continual mechanisms, namely k noisy sums and some independent noise (see the full version for details [15] ).
At time t, CMCO outputs D * t ∈ R t , an estimate of Dt ∈ R t (the first t terms of D ∈ R T ).
Theorem 2. CMCO is -differentially pan-private and for each time t ∈ [1, T ], ||D * t − Dt||2 =Õ(log 1.5 (T )/ ) with high probability. than S log(n/S) term. Since the compressive mechanism also incurs reconstruction errors, its accuracy is slightly worse than that of the Laplace mechanism. As n increases from 11342 in Figure 2 (a), and 2 15 = 32768 in Figure 2 (b), to 2 16 = 65536 in Figure 2 (c), the advantage of the Laplace mechanism for the case = 1 diminishes. For other choices of , the advantage of the compressive mechanism becomes increasingly clear with growing n.
To compare CMCO and the continual mechanism, we run both algorithms on SearchLog and NetTrace with = 0.1. Figure 3 displays the error rates of the two methods, in which the x-axis shows the timestamp t and the y-axis correspond to the changes in error, namely ||Dt−D * t ||2. Clearly, CMCO achieves significantly higher utility compared to the continual mechanism. In particular, the errors incurred by CMCO is roughly half of that of the continual mechanism. Additional experimental results, e.g., using basis other than Haar wavelet, are available in the full version [15] .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper introduces a novel compressive mechanism that realizes a universal privacy-preserving mechanism for publishing sensitive data. We apply this new method to both static and streaming datasets. Theoretical bounds and experimental results establish the superiority of the compressive mechanism compared to existing methods.
Regarding future work, we plan to apply the compressive mechanism to other privacy protection applications. Another interested topic is to adapt compressive mechanism under other privacy definitions, e.g. ( , δ)-differential privacy. Finally, we will devote research efforts on deriving the theoretical lower bound of the noise scale required to satisfy differential privacy, for arbitrary S-sparse databases.
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